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Kinship in Entrepreneur
Networks: Performance
Effects of Resource
Assembly in Africa
Jane N. O. Khayesi
Gerard George
John Antonakis
We examine the relationship among structural social capital, resource assembly, and firm
performance of entrepreneurs in Africa. We posit that social capital primarily composed of
kinship or family ties helps the entrepreneur to raise resources, but it does so at a cost.
Using data drawn from small firms in Kampala, Uganda, we explore how shared identity
among the entrepreneur’s social network moderates the relationship between social capital
and outcomes. A large network contributed a higher quantity of resources raised, but at a
higher cost when shared identity was high. We discuss the implications of these findings for
the role of family ties and social capital in resource assembly, with an emphasis on devel-
oping economies.
Introduction
A prominent literature on family business addresses the formation, governance, and
importance of family businesses in the global economy. Scholars have examined charac-
teristics such as family involvement, control, and governance with respect to agency
costs and benefits, among others (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Dyer, 2006; Fiegener,
2010; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007;
Gómez-Mejía, Nuñez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; O’Boyle, Pollack, & Rutherford, 2012).
Scholars are beginning to examine social capital in family firms with respect to its creation
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009) and impact on firm
performance (Dyer). Social capital and social networks facilitate the acquisition of
resources (Kotha & George, 2012) that are utilized to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities
(Baker & Nelson, 2005), and impact performance and value creation (George, 2005).
Social capital and networks are particularly important to small, family firms that tend
to draw heavily on family or kinship ties for resource acquisition especially at the nascent
firm formation phase (Arregle et al., 2007; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Greve & Salaff,
2003; Khayesi & George, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Defined loosely, kinship ties
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include relationships by blood and marriage (Peredo, 2003; Stewart, 2003), and comprise
one’s spouse, parents, children, and other relatives like siblings and in-laws (Kotha &
George, 2012; Renzulli, Aldrich, & Moody, 2000). In African societies, kin relations are
extensive and include nuclear as well as extended families (Khavul et al., 2009; Smith,
2009), numbering sometimes into hundreds or even the size of a tribe (Mbiti, 1969).
Despite increasing research on social capital, family firms, and entrepreneurship
research in general, developing countries continue to receive little research attention in
comparison to developed economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; Khavul et al.,
2009). Our study draws from literature on family firms, kinship, and social capital to
examine the influence of family and kin-induced social capital on entrepreneurs’ resource
accumulation efforts in an under-researched context, that of a developing economy.
Whereas the positive contribution of social capital and networks to resource acquisition is
widely acknowledged, there is growing theoretical recognition of risks of social capital
(Adler & Kwon, 2002)—for example, the cost of capital associated with raising resources
from the social network (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002), the hindrance of new
information flowing into the network, and problems of free riding from network members
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). This cost implies that maintaining a vibrant network that
yields resources also requires investment of one’s time, effort, and resources in meeting
the demands of the network members. Such risks can be detrimental to small firms that
rely heavily on family and kinship ties.
We examine the aggregate cost of raising resources, which includes the cost of
social capital comprising interest paid on money that is borrowed (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi &
Gillespie, 2002), plus the cost of maintaining the network. We use our empirical research
to draw implications for small, family firms because they rely heavily on or involve kin
relations in their social networks (Arregle et al., 2007; Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005).
The fact that “network ties among family create constraints, as well as opportunities for
entrepreneurship” (Steier, Chua, & Chrisman, 2009) makes our research particularly
applicable to family firms whose social capital can generate resources as well as increase
costs of maintaining the network, thus affecting the aggregate cost of raising resources.
Unlike the Western concept of “family” comprising close, immediate relatives, such as
first cousins, a family in Africa comprises kin members from extended families (Ayisi,
1979; Khavul et al., 2009; Mbiti, 1969).
Our empirical research is conducted in Uganda, an African country. This African
setting, a developing economy context, adds insight into theories that have been developed
predominantly in high-income economies by reflecting on a contextual constraint of social
capital. Additionally, there remains limited management research on emerging economies,
especially in Africa (Bruton et al., 2008; George, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012; Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Khavul et al., 2009). Entrepreneurs operate within settings
characterized by multiethnic or cultural diversity (Marris, 1971; Mbiti, 1969) and high
dependency1 reflecting the proportion of individuals who do not work (World Bank,
2007). High dependency implies that entrepreneurs not only pursue profit-making goals
but also have to satisfy the needs of dependents, including community welfare objectives.
1. The total dependency ratio in developing countries is much higher than that of developed economies. For
example, in 2005, the total dependency ratio in least developed countries was 80% while that of North
America was 49%, Northern Europe 51%, and Southern Europe 48%. In Africa, East Africa had the highest
dependency ratio (90%) compared with other parts of Africa (Western: 86%, Central: 83%, Northern: 61%,
and Southern: 58%). Even within East Africa, Uganda’s total dependency ratio was the highest (108%)
compared with Kenya (83%), Tanzania (91), Rwanda (82%), and Burundi (79) (United Nations Population
Division, 2008).
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High dependence on other community members is likely to affect resource assembly
efforts; entrepreneurs often find that they have to meet the social and financial needs of
community members, thus limiting their ability to accumulate resources in order to invest
in their business ventures.
The findings inform organizational and family business research in the following
areas: (1) the importance of analyzing the cost implications of acquiring resources using
one’s social capital, particularly from family members or kin relations; (2) the need to
go beyond analyzing firm performance effects arising from the amount of resources
assembled, to examining performance implications associated with the cost of raising
resources; and (3) the implications of cost associated with the extent of involvement of
family members in an entrepreneur’s network.
Theory Development and Hypotheses
Social capital theory assumes that economic action is embedded in social relations
(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). The premise is that networks of relationships are a
resource that facilitate as well as constrain social and economic activities and outcomes
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Although there is no
universally accepted definition of social capital, researchers agree that social capital is
a valuable resource that is embedded in a network of relationships, and facilitates the
realization of other resources for individuals and/or organizations (Adler & Kwon;
Coleman, 1990). We define social capital as a focal actor’s (individual or group) network
of relationships, including the structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions that may
facilitate and/or constrain its actions and outcomes.
Network Size and Quantity of Resources Raised
Network size reflects the capacity of an individual’s social network (Burt, 2000), and
is made of first-order network contacts of that individual (Greve & Salaff, 2003). We focus
on first-order contacts because benefits from second- and third-order contacts accrue to
the entrepreneur through the first-order contacts. The size of one’s network reflects the
extent of resources that that individual can access (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Kotha &
George, 2012). Therefore, we expect the amount of resources to increase with an increas-
ing network size. In the case of family firms, their social capital comprises, to a large
extent, family members (Arregle et al., 2007). Including family and kin in one’s network
contributes to an increased network size, particularly in contexts where definitions of
kinship extend beyond the nuclear family and immediate relatives, such as in Africa
(Khavul et al., 2009; Mbiti, 1969; Smith, 2009). In addition to being a committed source
of capital and other resources, family members and kinship relations are strategic in that
they are a source of connections to weak ties (Arregle et al.; Stewart, 2003).
Network size facilitates acquisition of resources in different ways. First, having a
large network increases the possibility of having a large number of weaker connections
among network members (Burt, 1997, 2000), providing improved chances of receiving
nonredundant information and resources. Second, having a large network facilitates
resource acquisition by increasing the number of sources of resources, and resource
accessibility (Uzzi, 1999). Compared with a small network, a large network gives an
entrepreneur more chances of finding someone who is likely to be supportive or to provide
resources. Indeed, kin relations enhance the size of one’s network especially in family
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firms characterized by strong family social capital (FSC). As the size of an entrepreneur’s
network increases, we expect the amount of resources raised to increase. We, however,
note that this relationship will be weaker in high dependency contexts, where a majority
of the network members may not be able to contribute financial resources given that they
do not have an income, when compared with low dependency contexts, such as most
Western countries.
Hypothesis 1: In networks dominated by kin, the size of a focal entrepreneur’s
network will be positively related to the quantity of resources raised through the
network.
Network Size and Aggregate Cost of Raising Resources
In raising resources, entrepreneurs incur certain costs that may affect their resource
accumulation efforts. Often studied is the interest paid for finances received or the cost
of capital (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). Aggregate cost of raising resources,
however, goes beyond cost of capital in order to maintain one’s network. Arregle et al.
(2007) point out that a strong FSC may bring about high maintenance costs for family
firms. Additionally, dysfunctional family realities or characteristics, such as norms, may
deter the positive effects of FSC (Arregle et al.). In Africa, such norms may arise from
cultural systems that are costly to entrepreneurs. Costs of maintaining a network can be
largely explained by the cultural value systems that go with kinship. Societal norms that
govern the roles of kinship could generate costs to a business—for example, family
obligations that exert pressure on entrepreneurs to support members of their extended
families. Family obligations comprise one of the forms of socioemotional wealth whose
preservation is valued by family firms irrespective of its negative effects on firm perfor-
mance (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Such obligations may increase agency costs due to
emotional attachment between the principal and the agent (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001;
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001).
In Africa, maintenance costs may take the form of using entrepreneurs’ financial
resources to fulfill social obligations or demands placed on them by their social relations
(Kiggundu, 2002). Responding to community demands or fulfilling family and social
obligations using firm resources may be due to entrepreneurs’ altruistic motives (Schulze
et al., 2001), and may increase agency costs. Such costs are further heightened by a high
dependency ratio implying a greater proportion of a nonworking population that exerts
pressure on entrepreneurs to fulfill their financial needs using firm resources.
The kinship system in Africa exerts pressure on individuals to provide for the needs
and obligations of other kin members (Ayisi, 1979; Mbiti, 1969). In East Africa, demands
from one’s social relations, particularly kin, may include financial contributions to com-
munity projects, paying school fees or medical expenses, and providing for financial
expenses of social events like weddings and dowry payment (Luke, Munshi, &
Rosenzweig, 2004; Mbiti). Such demands are necessitated by the fact that a good
proportion of the population does not work and therefore does not have an income.
Because of fear of consequences of nonconformity to the kinship normative value
of “sharing without reckoning,” for instance losing legitimacy, status, and a following,
entrepreneurs are forced to comply with demands from their social relations (Stewart,
2003). Additionally, family firms in the cousin consortium phase of ownership, where
cousins “can claim an owner-like control on the firm” (Smith, 2009), are faced with claims
for money, resources, and other business assets by kin relations, hence enhancing costs to
a firm. Using firm resources to fulfill family and kinship-related demands and allowing a
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cousin consortium kind of ownership to exist in one’s business may heighten the cost of
maintaining one’s network, hence interfering with the performance of firms (Stewart). We
expect the cost of maintaining a network to increase relative to the size of the network,
particularly in an African context where one’s network is dominated by kin.
In Africa, the kinship system governs social relationships and connects an individual
to several family members. Relationships in this context stretch far and wide to the extent
that “each individual is a brother or sister, father or mother, grandmother or grandfather,
or cousin, or brother-in-law, uncle or aunt or something else, to everybody else” (Mbiti,
1969, p. 104). This wide sense of the meaning of kinship implies that African entrepre-
neurs are likely to have large social networks comprising largely of kin members. Thus,
whereas kin increases the size of an entrepreneur’s network, this increase implies an
increased cost of maintaining the network. Therefore, as the entrepreneur’s network
expands, likewise, we expect the cost of maintaining a network to increase relative to the
network size. Therefore, we expect that:
Hypothesis 2: In networks dominated by kin, the size of a focal entrepreneur’s
network will be positively related to aggregate cost of raising resources through the
network.
The Role of Shared Identity
Shared identity in a network reflects commonality and cohesion among members
in the network. The commonality may be based on personal or social identification (Hite
& Hesterly, 2001), for instance, culture and norms (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005), professions
(Maurer & Ebers, 2006), shared codes and language (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), or
bounded solidarity (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). This commonality is a guiding factor
in the exchange of resources in identity-based networks, and may facilitate or hinder
resource accumulation. Often, identity-based networks comprise dense, cohesive net-
works of embedded ties (Hite & Hesterly).
The guiding principle of shared identity networks, particularly bounded solidarity,
is the support of individual goals of group members. Shared identity creates goodwill
and mutual understanding among network members, which in turn encourages network
members to support each other. Thus, through shared understanding, shared identity
facilitates social exchange and distributive justice (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), thus
enabling the exchange of resources among firms. In relation to costs, embedding trans-
actions in social relations promotes shared values and beliefs for parties involved, which
in turn helps reduce the cost of capital or interest paid on borrowed finances (Uzzi, 1999).
Hence, entrepreneurs often make use of their relatives as sources of start-up capital
because of lower costs of capital compared with the professional money providers
(Stewart, 2003).
The willingness of relatives to provide finances at a lower cost can be attributed to
shared identity arising from common social identity. However, shared identity that is
based on shared norms may create “excessive expectations of obligatory behavior and
possibly result in problems of free riding and unwillingness to experiment beyond the
network” (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005, p. 153). Thus, coupled with high dependency of kin
relations on entrepreneurs who are often perceived as wealthy individuals in Africa, such
norms imply that entrepreneurs have to incur heavy costs in fulfilling demands from their
network members. The high dependency ratio in Uganda would seem to imply that
entrepreneurs may not benefit from the low costs of capital since most of their network
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contacts may not have an income, and consequently little money to lend the entrepreneurs.
Instead, entrepreneurs would incur high costs maintaining these network members. Thus,
we expect that:
Hypothesis 3: In networks dominated by kin, the greater the shared identity between
a focal entrepreneur and his/her network contacts, the higher the quantity of resources
raised through the network.
Hypothesis 4: In networks dominated by kin, the greater the shared identity between
a focal entrepreneur and his/her network contacts, the higher the aggregate cost of
raising resources through the network.
Social capital features and dimensions are likely interrelated (Nahapiet & Ghoshal,
1998), and some social capital variables reinforce or amplify the effects of other social
capital variables. In this regard, we propose that shared identity, a measure of cognitive
social capital, will amplify the effects of structural social capital on resource accumula-
tion. Nahapiet and Ghoshal present cognitive social capital as a facilitator of resource
acquisition by providing “access to people and their information.” Moreover, Hite and
Hesterly (2001) have argued that an individual (the focal entrepreneur, in our case)
achieves advantages from his/her network ties because of the identity of the ties. Further,
Maurer and Ebers (2006) reiterate that shared identity (language and meanings) facilitates
accessibility to information and resources of network ties. Overall, therefore, shared
identity facilitates accessibility to the resources of the social relations that form the size of
an entrepreneur’s network. We expect shared identity to amplify the effects of network
size on the amount of resources raised through the network.
In relation to costs, shared values and beliefs among networks help reduce the cost of
financing (Uzzi, 1999), hence encouraging entrepreneurs to look for finances from their
family members and friends rather than professional money providers or financial institutions
(Stewart, 2003). On the contrary, high dependency along with free riding behavior will imply
heavy costs of maintaining a network. Thus, if an entrepreneur has a large network size,
greater social cohesion due to shared identity will likely amplify the cost effects of network
size, especially in the African context as described earlier. Therefore, we suggest that:
Hypothesis 5: In networks dominated by kin, the relation between network size and
quantity of resources raised through the network is moderated by shared identity such
that this relation is positive when shared identity is high and negative when shared
identity is low.
Hypothesis 6: In networks dominated by kin, the relation between network size and
aggregate cost of raising resources through the network is moderated by shared identity
such that this relation is positive when shared identity is high and negative when shared
identity is low.
Resource Accumulation and Firm Performance
Resource accumulation is a function of the resources acquired by a firm (resource
inflows) minus those being drained from the firm in the form of costs of acquiring
resources (resource outflows) (Knott, Bryce, & Posen, 2003). Whereas resources acquired
facilitate firm performance, the costs associated with raising those resources reduce the
amount of resources available for firm activities. In effect, this reduction of available
resources may limit firm performance. Indeed, the relationship between resources and
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firm performance has been widely researched (Coleman, 2007; Mishina, Pollock, &
Porac, 2004). However, lacking in these studies is an analysis of the influence of the cost
of raising those resources on firm performance, and this from a social capital perspective.
Of course, from an accounting point of view, such theorizing is self-evident; however,
these social costs to which we are referring affect the entrepreneur in the future (so they
are not accounted for in the short term, if accounted at all). We, therefore, posit that:
Hypothesis 7: The greater the amount of resources raised by an entrepreneur through
the network, the higher will be the firm performance.
Hypothesis 8: The greater the aggregate cost of raising resources through the network,
the lower will be the firm performance.
Sample and Method
We collected data on 242 small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs in the garment-
making and information and communication technology (ICT) industries in Kampala,
Uganda. Of these, data from 188 entrepreneurs were usable for this study. The participants
consisted of indigenous Ugandans of diverse ethnicity; to ensure maximum variability on
the variables of interest we also sampled entrepreneurs of Asian origin. Such diversity,
coupled with variation in firm size, yielded variation in social aspects of our study (e.g.,
social networks and the fulfillment of social obligations). We account for industry differ-
ences across a dynamic, high-technology (ICT) and a low-technology industry (garment
making). We used a structured questionnaire to collect data through face-to-face inter-
views. Key measures on our questionnaire were derived from literature to the extent
possible. We used six postgraduate students at Makerere University Business School in
Kampala, Uganda, to review the initial questionnaire, and pretested it on 15 entrepreneurs
in Kampala and revised it accordingly.
In developed economies, there are often lists and directories of businesses registered
in a geographic area or industry. As one might expect, the Ugandan authorities had no such
data. Because of the lack of a listing of firms, we used industry associations and university
sources to construct our initial list. A follow-up telephone call and physical visits to verify
the existence of these firms revealed that the existing lists were not up to date; many firms
were nonexistent, and others could not be found at the indicated addresses. Furthermore,
there were firms clustered in different parts of Kampala that did not appear on any of the
lists. Because of the inability to establish the exact number of firms in our population, we
visited all the firms in our population and conducted interviews with all who accepted
to be interviewed, yielding a total of 128 garment-making entrepreneurs and 114 ICT
entrepreneurs. All 242 surveys were completed in face-to-face interviews. Each interview
took between 45 and 90 minutes. Overall, it took us 5 months, between our initial contact
in our study area and the completion of data gathering.
Measures
We used several dependent, independent, and control variables to explore the rela-
tionship among structural social capital, resource accumulation, and firm performance.
Dependent Variables (DVs). We used three DVs to explore the relationship among
structural social capital, resource accumulation, and firm performance: quantity of
resources raised, aggregate cost of raising resources, and firm performance.
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Quantity of resources raised was measured as the total amount of money (in millions
of Ugandan shillings: U.S.$1 = approximately 2,000 Uganda shillings) that the entrepre-
neur had received in the past year from different contacts in his/her network. We asked
respondents to indicate the amount of money received from different contacts then added
it up to get the total amount of finances raised. Such resource generator techniques are
used to gather information on resources received and resource providers (Renzulli &
Aldrich, 2005).
Aggregate cost of raising resources was measured as the total amount of money (in
millions of Ugandan shillings) that the entrepreneur had incurred in the process of raising
both financial and nonfinancial resources for the firm. These included interest paid and
money spent on network contacts, for example, business lunches and dinners, and social
activities expenses, such as weddings and funerals. We asked respondents to indicate the
amount of money they had spent on each of these expenses then added it up to get the total
costs. To minimize problems associated with recall, respondents were asked to indicate
expenses incurred in the past year.
Firm performance was measured using an objective financial performance measure,
the volume of sales (in millions of Ugandan shillings) achieved by the entrepreneur’s firm
in the past year. Sales is described as a single, most preferred measure of firm performance
(Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003). We used the log-transformed value of sales given
the large variance and skewed distribution.
Independent Variables. We used network size as an independent variable: We measured
network size as the total volume of the respondent’s social network (Burt, 2000). We asked
respondents to indicate by category of relationship the number of people they interact with
regularly for resources for their businesses. This study focused on egocentric networks,
hence our interest in the first-order contacts of respondents (Greve & Salaff, 2003).
We explored both direct and moderating effects of shared identity in this study. We
measured shared identity using three statements reflecting the extent to which respondents
have similar cultural beliefs and value systems, and language with their network contacts.
We modeled this scale of shared identity (α = 0.69) after Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998),
borrowing concepts from the social psychology literature on social identity.
Control Variables. We included three firm-level control variables (industry, firm size,
and firm age) and one entrepreneur-related variable (religion). We chose these firm
demographic features as control variables consistent with previous research (Delmar
et al., 2003), which indicates that these firm characteristics influence firm performance.
To control for any industry effects on network characteristics and resource accessibility,
we measured industry using a dummy variable coded as 1 for garment-making entre-
preneurs and 0 for ICT entrepreneurs. To control for firm size effects, we measured
firm size as the number of full-time paid employees in 2007. Consistent with pre-
vious social capital studies (Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004; Yli-Renko, Autio, &
Sapienza, 2001), we measured firm age as the number of years since the founding of
the firm.
We included religion as a control variable in examining the relationship between
structural social capital on the one hand, and finances raised and cost of raising finances
on the other hand. We measured this variable categorically (using k − 1 dummy variables
for being Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and no religion). We included
religion because it is an important determinant of the extent to which an individual gives
financial support to other members of the community (Mbiti, 1969), as well as for the fact
that it proxies for many social- and cultural-level variables (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales,
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2006). Following this line of thinking, we expected that an entrepreneur’s religious
heritage has an important role in determining how much such an entrepreneur will give to
community members in an effort to fulfilling social obligations, and how much he/she will
avail for firm activities.
Model Specification Tests
There is a potential endogeneity issue between the social capital variables and the
DVs in the model due to possible omitted variables and simultaneous causality (i.e.,
the modeled independent variables may be caused by the DVs). For example, entrepre-
neurs who have raised more capital may consequently grow their network size. Thus,
simultaneous causality may bring about correlation between an explanatory variable
and the error term (Bascle, 2008; Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993), and thereby render
the estimates inconsistent (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). In order to
resolve the endogeneity problem and ensure that our estimates are consistent, we used an
instrumental variable (referred to hereafter as IV) regression method (Bascle). To use IV
methods, we had to find exogenous variables that we could use as instruments. Our
literature search yielded two instruments: the size of the immediate family (total number
of spouse/s, children, parents, and siblings), and a scale of social participation (α = 0.69),
composed of four items reflecting the extent to which the respondent participated in social
activities before founding the firm.
We also included total kin as an instrument because we expected it to correlate with
network size. Thus, the characteristics and influence of the network largely emanate from
the influence of kinship or family ties. We measured total kin as a count of all the kin
(immediate and extended family), both resource providing and nonresource providing, in
the entrepreneur’s network. We also included the demographic characteristics as instru-
ments: gender (1 for males and 0 for females), marital status (1 for married and 0 for
unmarried), race (1 for Africans and 0 for Asians), level of education (1 for respondents
who had attained some level of schooling and 0 otherwise), age (respondent’s absolute
chronological age in years), and tribe (1 for Muganda and 0 otherwise). Given the context,
all these variables are theoretically exogenous in the sense that they are beyond the choice
of the individuals and cannot be influenced by the other variables in the equation.
In addition, we included the following exogenous variables (that were available from
our data) as instruments: entrepreneur’s prior work experience (1 for respondents who had
done formal jobs previously and 0 for those with no formal jobs), entrepreneur’s parents’
business experience (1 if the respondent’s parents had business experience before the
respondent started his/her business venture and 0 otherwise), and the individual income
(in millions of Ugandan shillings). We included all control variables as instruments
(Antonakis et al., 2010). Also, by including all possible sources that correlate with the DV,
we anticipate that the model’s estimates will be consistent, even if instruments might not
be fully exogenous. Because we had multiple DVs being predicted by the same set of
independent and control variables, as well as several equations, we estimated the model
using three-stage least squares (3SLS) (Zellner & Theil, 1962). This is a full-information
IV regression method that ensures the efficient analysis of all equations in the model
(Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993).
Results
Our sample consisted mainly of very small and young firms, with a mean firm size
of three employees and an average organizational age of 5 years old (Table 1). The
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majority of the sampled firms had a large proportion of kin in their networks, averaging
70%; i.e., social networks of the respondents were dominated by family members or kin.
For correlations and descriptive statistics, refer to Table 1.
We present results of the IV regression analysis (Table 2) from the simultaneous
estimation of three equations where the DVs were the following: (1) quantity of resources
raised, (2) aggregate cost of raising resources, and (3) firm performance. Additionally, we
present results of the regression analysis using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
for comparative purposes (where social capital is assumed to be exogenous). It is evident
in Table 2 that although the OLS estimator has higher explanatory power of the variance
in firm performance (R2 of 0.10 versus 0.05 for the 3SLS estimator), the 3SLS estimator
yielded a higher number of significant estimates compared with the OLS estimator. For
example, for the firm performance model, both main effects yielded significant results
with the 3SLS estimator (β = 0.11, p < 0.01 for quantity of resources raised, and β = −1.17
p < 0.01 for cost of raising resources) but only one significant main effect, cost of raising
resources, with OLS (β = −0.54, p < 0.01). Similarly, there were two significant control
variables with 3SLS but only one significant control variable with OLS. Indeed, a
Hausman test for OLS versus 3SLS showed a significant difference for cost of raising
resources (t = −2.00, p < 0.05) and amount of resources raised (t = 21.32, p < 0.001). The
significant difference between the OLS and 3SLS shows that the social capital variables
are endogenous, thus justifying the use of IV regression (Antonakis et al., 2010).
To ensure that the 3SLS estimator was consistent vis-à-vis the two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimator, we conducted a Hausman test to determine whether the estimates
differed (if they do, then the 2SLS estimator must be retained). The chi-square for all
equations in our model was not significant (χ2[70] = 24.98, p > 0.05). Similarly, a
Hausman test for individual equations yielded nonsignificant chi-square for the cost
model (χ2[11] = 3.25, p > 0.05) and finances raised model (χ2[11] = 3.34, p > 0.05). These
results show that the estimates for the two models (2SLS and 3SLS) are not significantly
different; we thus retained the more efficient estimator, 3SLS, which was also consistent.
We performed a Hansen-Sargan’s overidentification test; results revealed that the instru-
ments were valid (χ2[48] = 56.88, p > 0.05), and overidentifying restrictions indicated that
this model was tenable (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007).
Among the control variables used, firm size yielded significant results across the three
models. Firm size had significant positive relationships with quantity of resources raised
(β = 3.86, p < 0.01), aggregate cost of raising resources (β = 0.55, p < 0.01), and firm
performance (β = 0.29, p < 0.05). In addition to firm size, firm age had a marginal
significant relationship with aggregate cost of raising resources (β = −0.13, p < 0.10),
whereas industry had a significant relationship to firm performance (β = −1.41, p < 0.05).
One religion categorical variable (being Hindu with respect to being Protestant) yielded
positive significant relationships with quantity of resources raised (β = 73.65, p < 0.01)
and aggregate cost of raising resources (β = 5.24, p < 0.01).
Next, we report the direct effects of the key variables (network size and shared
identity) on the quantity of resources raised, and the aggregate cost of raising resources.
We then move on to report the direct effects of the quantity of resources raised and the
aggregate cost of raising resources on firm performance. Note that because of the presence
of an interaction effect, the main effects are actually not interpretable as main effects
usually because these effects are not constant and depend on the level of the moderator
(Aiken & West, 1991). When holding shared identity constant at its mean, network size
yielded positive significant relationships with quantity of resources raised (β = 0.27,
p < 0.05) and aggregate cost of raising resources (β = 0.04, p < 0.05), providing support
for hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. As for shared identity, it showed no relationship with
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Table 2
Results of IV Regression Analysis
Variables
3SLS OLS
Network
size
Shared
identity
Aggregate
cost
Resources
raised
Firm
performance
Firm
performance
Aggregate cost −1.17*** −0.54***
(3.43) (2.90)
Resources raised 0.11*** 0.03
(2.75) (1.41)
Industry† 7.77** 0.93*** −0.53 −2.72 −1.41** −1.00
(2.29) (3.88) (0.57) (0.42) (1.99) (1.50)
Firm size 0.80** 0.01 0.55*** 3.86*** 0.29** 0.28***
(2.40) (0.27) (7.05) (7.18) (2.22) (3.09)
Firm age −0.59* −0.00 −0.13* −0.80 −0.05 −0.02
(1.71) (0.20) (1.72) (1.47) (0.61) (0.30)
Total kin 0.21** −0.03***
(2.49) (4.60)
Male‡ 6.35** −0.27
(2.07) (1.22)
Marital status −0.26 0.08
(0.09) (0.41)
African§ 10.45 −0.33
(1.33) (0.59)
Education 19.23*** 0.25
(2.94) (0.53)
Work experience 3.99 −0.13
(1.50) (0.67)
Entrepreneur’s age −0.34* −0.01
(1.84) (0.79)
Parents’ bus. exp. 1.95 (0.70) 0.81*** (4.12)
Individual income 3.55** 0.11
(2.16) (0.98)
Social participation 3.58*** 0.04
(2.80) (0.40)
Size of immediate fam. 3.05*** (9.80) 0.05** (2.29)
Tribe 1.62 −0.01
(0.60) (0.08)
Network size (1) −0.28**¶ −1.92**††
(2.55) (2.52)
Shared identity (2) −3.78***‡‡ −22.96**§§
(2.83) (2.48)
(1) × (2) 0.08*** (2.71) 0.54*** (2.67)
Constant −55.71*** 4.95*** 14.44*** 80.00** 3.35*** 2.53***
(4.07) (5.10) (2.84) (2.27) (4.90) (4.38)
R-squared 0.58 0.40 0.28 0.41 0.05 0.10
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
Notes: z-statistics are in parentheses. n = 188. Religion dummy variables included. The simple main effects of these variables
when the moderator (i.e., the variable with which it interacts) is held constant at its mean are, respectively (z-statistics
in parentheses), ¶ 0.04 (2.21), p < 0.05; †† 0.27 (2.20), p < 0.05; ‡‡ −0.44 (1.03), p > 0.10; §§ −0.12 (0.04), p > 0.10.
† Garment industry = 1 (0 = information and communication technology).
‡ Male = 1 (0 = female).
§ African = 1 (0 = Asian).
3SLS, three-stage least squares; OLS, ordinary least squares; IV, instrumental variable.
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quantity of resources raised (β = −0.12, p > 0.05) and aggregate cost of raising resources
(β = 0.44, p > 0.10), showing lack of support for hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively.
Hypotheses 7 and 8 postulated the direct effects of quantity of resources raised and
aggregate cost of raising resources on firm performance. As hypothesized, the quantity
of resources raised yielded a positive significant relationship with firm performance
(β = 0.11, p < 0.01), whereas the aggregate cost of raising resources had a negative
significant relationship with firm performance (β = −1.17, p < 0.01), supporting hypoth-
eses 7 and 8, respectively. To better understand how quantity and cost of resources affect
firm performance, and to provide a measure of effects, and given that the DV is in logs,
we can interpret the relation between the independent variables (IVs) and the DVs as
follows: When quantity of resources is raised by 1 unit, firm performance increases by
11%. However, when cost of resources changes by 1 unit, firm performance drops
by 117%. Note that a Wald test indicated that the coefficients of the cost of resources and
quantity of resources are significantly different (χ2[1] = 11.63, p < 0.001).
To test the moderating effect of shared identity on the relationship between structural
social capital and resource accumulation, we examine the interaction effects of shared
identity and network size. As expected, the interaction between shared identity and
network size was positive and highly significant for quantity of resources raised (β = 0.54,
p < 0.01) and aggregate cost of raising resources (β = 0.08, p < 0.01). To probe this
interaction, we plotted the interaction effects graphs for high and low values of shared
identity (Figures 1 and 2) and also tested the simple slopes. Both the regression analysis
and interaction graphs support hypotheses 5 and 6.
Discussion and Implications for Family Firms
Seventy percent of the entrepreneurs’ networks in our sample were kin and family
members. Hence, we discuss our study results and draw implications for family firms. We
Figure 1
Effect of Network Size on the Amount of Finances Raised Moderated by
Shared Identity
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set out to examine the moderating effect of shared identity on the relationship between
structural social capital (network size) and resource accumulation (quantity of resources
raised and the aggregate cost of raising resources). We further investigated the effect of
resource accumulation on firm performance. The results reveal that shared identity mod-
erates the relationship between network size and resource accumulation, with the inter-
action model yielding highly significant results as hypothesized. Finally, as postulated, the
amount of resources raised significantly increased firm performance, whereas the cost of
raising resources significantly reduced firm performance.
Our findings support the moderating effects for quantity of resources raised and
aggregate cost of raising resources when shared identity is high. Hypothesis 5, which
stipulated a positive relationship between network size and quantity of resources raised
when shared identity was high, was supported. Likewise, hypothesis 6, which stipulated
a positive relationship between network size and cost of raising resources when shared
identity was high, was supported. Previous entrepreneurship studies (Kotha & George,
2012; Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005; Renzulli et al., 2000) have also found positive relation-
ships between network size and resources accessibility and acquisition. The finding that
shared identity moderates the relationship between structural social capital and resource
accumulation is a step forward in unearthing conditions under which structural social
capital may affect resource accumulation positively and negatively.
The evidence further supports our hypotheses on the relationship between the amount
of resources raised and cost of raising those resources, and firm performance. Our findings
reveal that more resources lead to higher firm performance, whereas higher costs reduce
firm performance, and confirm prior studies (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Coleman, 2007;
Mishina et al., 2004). Indeed, our analysis of marginal effects reveals that the cost of raising
resources has far greater negative effects on firm performance in comparison to the positive
effects of resources raised. These cost effects do outweigh the positive effects of resources
raised. This finding on negative performance may serve as a further empirical evidence of
Gómez-Mejía et al.’s (2007) proposition that poor performance by family firms may be
Figure 2
Effect of Network Size on Cost of Resources Moderated by Shared Identity
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attributed to their willingness to preserve their socioemotional wealth irrespective of its
negative consequences to the firm. Clearly, one of the objectives of family business research
is to explain performance differences among family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005). O’Boyle
et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis found no relationship between family involvement and firm
performance when moderated by public versus private firms, firm size, and culture. Based
on our finding of a negative relationship between cost of raising resources and performance,
we suggest that family business researchers consider the cost of raising resources as a
moderator/mediator when studying performance differences among family firms. There
is, therefore, a need for family firm researchers to examine not only the amount of
resources raised through an entrepreneur’s network but also the cost implications
of raising resources, in order to explain performance differences among family firms.
The emerging economy context, especially African economies, is gaining importance
as these countries take more active roles in the global economy, development, and
governance. Recent calls for research highlight entrepreneurship as a crucial tool to
engender prosperity and improve social and economic well-being (e.g., Bruton et al.,
2008; George et al., 2012). Our findings extend our empirical knowledge of the drivers of
performance and survival of family firms in this context (Khavul et al., 2009). Equally
important, this study provides fresh insight into how an entrepreneurs’ social network
could also impose significant costs. For family firms, these costs may be attributed to
kinship and its associated family obligations (Stewart, 2003) arising from the heavy
involvement of family members. We add to the emergent discussions in the management
literature of how FSC can contribute positively and negatively to firm performance in an
entrepreneurial setting in an emerging context.
The findings are of practical relevance to entrepreneurs, especially family firms.
Entrepreneurs wishing to achieve higher performance vis-à-vis the resources raised ought
to aim at maximizing resources raised from networks while reducing the associated costs.
Our study reveals that within the context of an emerging economy, such a performance
target requires a combination of a large network and lower shared identity with network
contacts—our study showed that negative effects of costs outweigh positive effects of
resources raised by far—in order to improve performance through minimizing costs.
Indeed, this negative performance effect of costs in family firms in Africa can be attributed
to the constraining role of extended family ties resulting from family obligations, oppor-
tunism, and agency (Khavul et al., 2009). Thus, our advice to family firm entrepreneurs is
that they carefully consider network members with lesser shared identity. In essence, this
means that family firms ought to include more nonfamily ties in their social networks in
order to reduce the costs of raising resources.
Overall, our study reveals that the configuration of an entrepreneur’s structural
social capital can help us understand both positive and negative contributions of struc-
tural social capital to resource accumulation especially for family firms. By engaging the
debate on the negative contributions of social capital, this study supports scholars (Adler
& Kwon, 2002) who have argued for the need to go beyond overemphasizing the positive
attributes of social capital to presenting a balanced analysis of both its risks and benefits.
Within the Ugandan setting, the results of this study reveal the importance of shared
identity as a moderator of the relationship between structural social capital and resource
accumulation variables.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
A collective, African communal context adds to family business research knowledge
of how social networks could be a benefit that comes at a great cost especially when
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entrepreneurs rely heavily on family members. Nonetheless, our study does have its
limitations. First, we used cross-sectional data in our study. Given that social capital is a
phenomenon that can change over time, our results do not capture this temporal effect.
Future studies could attempt a longitudinal examination of whether the contribution
of structural social capital to resource accumulation changes over time, and under what
circumstances such changes may occur. Second, we utilized one measure of cost, total
cost, in our study. Future studies could disaggregate this cost by investigating the relative
contribution of different types of network members, such as immediate kin, extended kin,
nonkin, and other members of the network, to cost rather than look at the cost of the
network as a whole.
This study was conducted in an urban setting in a single country. An effort was made
to include indigenous Ugandans from different ethnic groups, as well as Asians and other
non-Ugandan entrepreneurs. Future studies, however, can benefit by including both a rural
and urban sample within the same study so as to investigate whether social capital of
entrepreneurs (and the related costs) differs based on the context—rural or urban.
Although these data were collected in a developing country context, we believe that the
results of this study are applicable to other contexts too. Our model includes contextual
factors, such as race, gender, industry, and firm age, which make it possible to compare
results across different contexts and countries. Again, a comparison of results from
different countries and organizational contexts is necessary to explain cost-related and
resource-related performance differences across firms in different contexts, and to further
validate our model. These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that the insights gained
by our findings have made a contribution to management and entrepreneurship research,
particularly understanding how social capital enhances and limits resource assembly. This
study has shown that it is important to take into account not only the amount of resources
assembled, but also the cost of raising resources, in order to improve firm performance.
Conclusion
This study examined the moderating role of shared identity on the relationship
between structural social capital (network size) and quantity of resources raised, and the
aggregate cost of raising resources. We further examined the effect of resources raised and
the cost of raising those resources on firm performance. Results show that shared identity
interacts with network size to facilitate resource accumulation, particularly the quantity of
resources raised and the aggregate cost of raising resources. The findings show that the
interaction effect of network size and shared identity significantly increases quantity and
cost of raising resources. Ultimately, the resources raised and aggregate cost of raising
those resources determine performance differences among entrepreneurial firms, espe-
cially family firms. The key contribution of this study lies in advancing our understanding
of situations under which structural social capital might benefit or detract entrepreneurs’
efforts to assemble resources to build and maintain a viable venture.
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